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ABSTRACT
Pension fund investments have a substantial inﬂuence on
sustainability. We analyze preferences for sustainable investment
among a representative cross-section of 2486 pension fund
participants in the Netherlands, through a questionnaire survey
ﬁelded in the LISS panel. In contrast to standard investment
theory, we ﬁnd that sustainable investments are commonly
favored, even if they harm ﬁnancial interests. To explain variation
among participants’ preferences for sustainable investments, we
test socio-demographic factors suggested by dominant
neoclassical investment and behavioral ﬁnance theories.
Moreover, we add to the existing literature by developing an
alternative cultural-theoretical explanation that stresses the role of
value orientations. We estimate linear and generalized ordered
logit regression models, and ﬁnd little support for neoclassical and
behavioral ﬁnance theories, but substantial support for the
importance of value orientations. Given established patterns of
value-change, this ﬁnding suggests that a further increase in the
demand for sustainable investments across developed economies
is a likely scenario.
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1. Introduction
Over the past decades, the ﬁnancial assets of pension funds worldwide have grown mas-
sively, reaching 43.4 trillion USD in the OECD area in 2017 and on average accounting for
50.7% of GDP (OECD, 2018). With the deepening of ﬁnancialization (see Epstein, 2005;
Van der Zwan, 2014), pension funds are now a determining economic factor for sustain-
able development of societies. Hence, responsible pension investments are very important,
and increasingly so. As ‘universal investors’ that invest in a large part and every sector of
the economy, pension funds should have an economic interest in minimizing social costs
(Monks and Minow, 1995), and the investment choices that they make – given the large
size of the assets under their management – have a signiﬁcant impact on third parties.
Hawley and Williams (2000) see in the ‘universal ownership’ of ﬁduciary institutions,
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primarily pension funds – they own a large share of private enterprise – the rise of
‘ﬁduciary capitalism’. Clark and Hebb (2004) introduced the notion of ‘pension fund
capitalism’. Moreover, pension funds have intergenerational responsibilities. Arguably,
they must be long-horizon investors, looking beyond ﬁnancial considerations, and con-
sider environmental, social and governance (ESG) information in their investment
policy. In this way, pension funds could make all the diﬀerence in achieving the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
Most OECD countries feature deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension plans, wherein a speciﬁc
retirement beneﬁt amount is promised in advance. Over the past decade, however,
there has been a gradual shift to deﬁned contribution (DC) pensions inside as well as
outside the OECD. With DC, the employer promises speciﬁed contributions, but the
beneﬁts depend especially on investment returns. This shifts the investment, inﬂation
and longevity risks associated with pensions to the individual participants (Broadbent
et al., 2006; Blome et al., 2007; OECD, 2015). Reasons for this shift from DB to DC
arrangements include the increased individualization, growing heterogeneity, and more
demanding nature of pension fund participants. DC pension plans, with the option to
exercise choice, are considered a solution for these developments (Bovenberg et al.,
2012; EIOPA, 2013). Creating options to choose from within pension plans and increasing
the involvement of pension fund participants, taking into account both their ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial preferences should be important to the ‘universal investor’ pension funds.
They are, after all, essentially collective actors that aggregate the individual preferences
of their beneﬁciaries into single decisions on the market.
However, following the general trend in investment literature of focusing on the econ-
omic tradeoﬀ between risk and return, pension fund investment policy in practice has
focused on the ﬁnancial interests of the funds’ beneﬁciaries (see, e.g. Vitols, 2011;
Derwall et al., 2011; Renneboog et al., 2011). There still is little attention for non-
ﬁnancial preferences regarding environmental and social sustainability of investors in
general and pension fund beneﬁciaries in particular (Boersch, 2010; Frijns, 2010; Peijnen-
burg et al., 2011; Delsen, 2012; Eurosif, 2018). Thus, pension funds carry out an invest-
ment policy that likely neglects these non-ﬁnancial preferences of the beneﬁciaries, and
the potential heterogeneity therein. We therefore analyze the extent to which beneﬁciaries
have preferences for sustainable pension fund investments, and how variation in these pre-
ferences can be explained. Our study contributes to the academic study of sustainable
investment in three ways.
First, we collect novel, large-scale microdata on pension fund participants’ willingness
to pay higher pension premiums or accept lower pensions in exchange for having their
pension funds choose sustainable investments. Second, our data include a large set of
socio-demographic predictors, allowing us to test the applicability of explanations
derived from the socially responsible investment (SRI) literature to pension fund
investments.
Third, we develop and test an alternative, cultural explanation for sustainable invest-
ment preferences, derived from sociology and political science theory. We draw in particu-
lar on Ingelhart’s (1977, 1990) work on material and post-material value orientations.
While the investment literature has started to expand neoclassical assumptions and incor-
porated insights from behavioral economics about psychological dispositions such as risk
appetite and social preferences, as well as increasingly recognizing the importance of value
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orientations, what value orientations matter and how remains obscure (cf. Williams,
2007). This is unfortunate because, in contrast to psychological dispositions such as risk
appetite, the distribution of value orientations is known to systematically co-vary with
contextual characteristics. In particular, shifts in this distribution follow predictable pat-
terns of cohort-replacement, which in turn are linked to speciﬁc socio-economic contexts
(e.g. Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Value orientations can thus be
interpreted as endogenous preferences (cf. Bowles, 1998) that vary systematically across
diﬀerent macro-level contexts. If a micro link between preferences for sustainable invest-
ments and value orientations can be identiﬁed, this knowledge thus allows for a powerful
tool in the evaluation of scenarios in the development over time and variation between
countries in sustainable investment preferences for pension funds. Thus, while the
current paper will only analyze a single country and cross-section of pension fund partici-
pants, i.e. the micro link; its results can form an important contribution to the develop-
ment of such a toolkit.
We collect data on beneﬁciaries’ preferences for sustainability through a questionnaire
survey. Our data constitute a representative sample of pension fund participants aged 40
and over in the Netherlands (N = 2486). With a questionnaire item that forces respondents
to choose a monetary tradeoﬀ between sustainable investment of their pension fund
against higher premiums or lower beneﬁts, we create an ordinal measurement beneﬁci-
aries’ willingness to pay for sustainable pension fund investment. We estimate linear
(OLS) models and generalized ordered logit models that explain variation in this variable
as a function of socio-demographic characteristics, risk appetite and value orientations of
the respondents.
Our results suggest strong preferences for sustainability among beneﬁciaries, with
roughly three quarters of respondents favoring sustainable investment of their pension
funds in exchange for higher premiums or lower beneﬁts. As expected based on cultural
theory, respondents with post-material value orientations are particularly willing to pay
for sustainable investment. We ﬁnd mixed results regarding the impact of socio-demo-
graphic characteristics: gender, age, educational attainment and employment status
have an eﬀect but, contrary to what would be excepted based on previous SRI research,
income, home ownership, religiosity and risk appetite do not.
In the next Section 2, we provide an overview of the investment literature applied to
pension fund investments. Section 3 introduces our application of cultural theory to the
explanation of preferences for sustainable pension fund investments and deduces hypoth-
eses from this application. We then present in Section 4 arguments why the Netherlands
oﬀers an interesting and appropriate case for researching the willingness to pay for non-
ﬁnancial preferences of pension fund participants. The data and methods used to test these
hypotheses are described in Section 5. The last two sections 6 and 7 present the analyses
and discussion of the results and oﬀer some policy recommendations.
2. Literature review: pension fund investment theory and practice
We started our literature review by collecting the published empirical studies on conven-
tional and socially responsible investors, and on pension funds participants’ preferences.
In the literature search we used the following data bases: ISI Web of Science, Scopus and
Google Scholar. Keywords used included: investment theory, investment decision, pension
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funds, ﬁduciary duty, socially responsible investment, beneﬁciaries, preferences, values.
From the resultant studies, we identiﬁed those relevant to our research question and
ordered them accordingly what we view to be the two main theoretical approaches in
the ﬁeld: (a) neoclassical investment theory, and (b) behavioral ﬁnance theory.
2.1. Dominant neoclassical investment theory and practice
The neoclassical investment theory (mean-variance portfolio theory) is an important
starting point of the investment policy of pension funds. The Asset Liability Management
(ALM) studies widely used by pension funds in OECD countries, including the Nether-
lands, assume rationality of investors and a tendency towards equilibrium (‘mean rever-
sion’) on ﬁnancial markets (Blome et al., 2007; De Dreu and Bikker, 2012). Through
ALM the investments and liabilities are examined in relation to each other over a long
period. These ALM-studies allow pension funds to establish which investment policy pro-
duces the highest expected returns, and so the lowest average premium and most indexa-
tion, at acceptable risks.
In the mean-variance portfolio theory the investor is reduced to a ‘homo economicus’
that makes a rational tradeoﬀ between risk and return of the available investment options.
Individuals are presumed to be homogenously and constantly risk-averse (Markowitz,
1952; Roy, 1952). By looking at the expected return and variance of an asset, the investor
seeks the lowest variance for a given expected return or seeks the highest expected return
for a given variance level. The portfolio theory is an explanation for the fact that, in order
to increase returns, pension funds have invested more in more risky assets. The latter
increased the degree of ﬁnancialization (see, e.g. Van der Zwan, 2014). The portfolio
theory also explains why in empirical research the emphasis is on comparison of
returns and risk between SRI and conventional investments (see, e.g. Williams, 2007;
Renneboog et al., 2008; Derwall et al., 2011).
The mean-variance portfolio theory suggests that it is impossible for SRI to outperform
conventional investments. SRI is less eﬃcient than conventional investments, for it limits
the investment universe and is at the expense of diversiﬁcation of the portfolio. SRI implies
that investors are willing to accept less than optimal ﬁnancial results to meet their personal
values with respect to social responsibility (Renneboog et al., 2011). However, empirical
results justify the conclusion that taking into account ESG information does not deterio-
rate the risk-return proﬁle (see Bauer et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008; Riedl and Smeets,
2017; Jansson et al., 2014; Friede et al., 2015).
2.2. Behavioral ﬁnance
Recent, more realistic, socially and psychologically based behavioral ﬁnance literature
(‘behavioral ﬁnance’) indicates that in addition to the traditional ﬁnancial needs also
other considerations and needs of investors can play a role (Mitchell and Utkus, 2004;
Statman, 2014). For part of the investors, SRI not only means risk and yield optimization,
but also represents individual and social values – non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts. The rational
investor is replaced by the normal investor. The diﬀerence between a rational investor
and a normal investor is the willingness to separate their role as investor from the role
as consumer. The rational investor is only interested in wealth, the utilitarian beneﬁts
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of investments. The socially responsible investor mixes the role of investor and consumer.
As a consumer, he cares about all the beneﬁts, the utilitarian (high returns and low risk),
the expressive (values, taste and status) and the emotional (feeling), of the products and
services he buys with the accumulated wealth. Between these beneﬁts there are
tradeoﬀs; some investors are willing to pay with a lower utilitarian beneﬁt for more expres-
sive and emotional beneﬁts (Williams, 2007; Statman, 2014; Barber et al., 2018). The will-
ingness to pay mirrors the willingness to accept these tradeoﬀs.
Empirical results for various OECD countries support this connection between con-
sumer and investor behavior. Most investors consider investments not only as invest-
ment products, also as consumer goods and are willing to give up some return for
social or environmental impact (Borgers and Pownall, 2014; Rossi et al., 2018; Barber
et al., 2018). SRI is not only values-driven (non-ﬁnancial motivations), but also value
(proﬁt) driven (McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Pérez-Gladish et al., 2012). Only a min-
ority of socially responsible investors is exclusively guided by values. Williams (2007)
found in his cross-country study that SRI is driven by preferences for non-ﬁnancial
income, i.e. more by social goals than by ﬁnancial returns. Similarly, Bauer and
Smeets (2015) ﬁnd that return expectations are not the major driver of SRI. Other
studies show that ﬁnancial considerations dominate the investment choices made
(Derwall et al., 2011; Renneboog et al., 2011; Riedl and Smeets, 2017; Bauer and
Smeets, 2010). The extent to which socially responsible investors are willing to
sacriﬁce ﬁnancial returns is suggested to depend on their values, their social – and pol-
itical preferences (Bollen, 2007; Bauer and Smeets, 2010, 2015; Jansson et al., 2014; Riedl
and Smeets, 2017) (Table 1).
Based on the SRI literature the expected signs of the eﬀects of personal and social-
demographics factors on investment decisions are summarized in Table 1. Preferences
Table 1. Expected signs (hypotheses) of eﬀects of personal and socio-economic characteristics on
preferences for sustainable pension fund investments.
Variable Expected sign References
Gender (female) + McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Williams, 2007; Junkus and Berry, 2010; Pérez-
Gladish et al., 2012; Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2013; Bauer and Smeets, 2015;
Rossi et al., 2018; Bauer et al., 2018
Age -+ McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Williams, 2007; Junkus and Berry, 2010; Pérez-
Gladish et al., 2012; Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2013; Riedl and Smeets, 2017;
Jansson et al., 2014; Bauer and Smeets, 2015; Rossi et al., 2018; Bauer et al.,
2018
Education +0 McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Williams, 2007; Junkus and Berry, 2010; Riedl
and Smeets, 2017; Pérez-Gladish et al., 2012; Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2013;
Jansson et al., 2014; Bauer and Smeets, 2015; Rossi et al., 2018; Bauer et al.,
2018
Income +- McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Williams, 2007; Junkus and Berry, 2010; Pérez-
Gladish et al., 2012; Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2013; Bauer and Smeets, 2015;
Rossi et al., 2018; Bauer et al., 2018
Wealth + - Williams, 2007; Junkus and Berry, 2010; Bauer and Smeets, 2015
Household
composition
Partner + -
Children +-
Junkus and Berry, 2010; Rossi et al., 2018; Pérez-Gladish et al., 2012; Rossi
et al., 2018
Primary
occupation
Self-employed +
Retired - +
Junkus and Berry, 2010; Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2013
Company size + Williams, 2007
Risk appetite +0 Riedl and Smeets, 2017; Pérez-Gladish et al., 2012; Bauer and Smeets, 2015
Religious + Williams, 2007; Pérez-Gladish et al., 2012; Bauer and Smeets, 2015
Notes: + = signiﬁcant positive eﬀect; - = signiﬁcant negative eﬀect; 0 = not signiﬁcant eﬀect.
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of pension fund members have become more heterogeneous due to the increasing variety
of household composition, the increasing heterogeneity in career and life course, and the
increasing level of prosperity (see, for example, Bovenberg et al., 2012). We expect pension
fund members in terms of composition, preferences and values to be more heterogeneous
than socially responsible investors (Jansson et al., 2014).
Research on preferences for SRI of pension fund members is still very limited and
mostly of recent date. Surveys show that the vast majority (up to three quarters) of the
Dutch pension fund participants are willing to pay a higher premium or to forego
pension income for the realization of these non-ﬁnancial preferences (Erbé, 2008; Moti-
vaction, 2012; Borgers and Pownall, 2014; I&O Research, 2015; Apostolakis et al.,
2016). Apostolakis et al. (2018) ﬁnd that beneﬁciaries’ attitudes and social norms
impact on their willingness to adopt socially responsible portfolios, but that this also
depends on consumer conﬁdence and perceived eﬀectiveness. Similarly, using a survey
questionnaire, Jansson et al. (2014) ﬁnd that beneﬁciaries in Sweden on average prefer
their pension funds to engage in SRI, and that ﬁnancial motives as well as self-transcen-
dent value priorities drive heterogeneity herein.
The expressiveness of such survey results is sometimes doubted, as they measure no
actual choices and may lead to socially desirable answers. However, a recent large scale
ﬁeld experiment (Bauer et al., 2018) comparing pension fund participants’ SRI investment
decision with real consequences to hypothetical decisions ﬁnds no diﬀerences, suggesting
that hypothetical questionnaire items can validly measure SRI preferences. This exper-
iment also showed that 66.7% of the participants favor the expansion of sustainable invest-
ing of their pension savings, the majority of which do so accepting lower ﬁnancial returns
in exchange. Diﬀerences in SRI preferences are found to be associated with social prefer-
ences and not driven by ﬁnancial beliefs.
A second potential criticism of the analysis of pension fund participants’ preferences for
sustainable investments is that it may be doubtful whether people correctly assess and
weigh the consequences of their choices (pension illiteracy). Research by Borgers and
Pownall (2014) shows that, while roughly three-quarters of people in the Netherlands
age 20 and over are willing to give up pension beneﬁts in exchange for SRI, they indeed
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to take into account non-ﬁnancial preferences when making ﬁnancial
decisions, particularly those with low levels of ﬁnancial sophistication. This may
obscure the link between stated SRI preferences and actual utility derived from SRI. On
the other hand, experimental research suggests that altruistic decisions are to large
degree in fact consistent with utility maximization (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), which
may well be extrapolated to SRI preferences.
3. Theory and hypotheses: materialism and post-materialism
The cultural-theoretical approach advocated by Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990) can be inter-
preted as a modiﬁcation of modernization theory. Modernization theory argues that long-
term economic development, in particular industrialization, leads to a growing division of
labor, commercialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, economic growth and econ-
omic scale. These developments imply an environment of increasing commitment to
economic and technical rationality. Individuals respond to this environment by increasing
adherence to individualism and instrumentalism (cf. Inkeles, 1960).
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While Inglehart accepts that socio-economic context shapes individual modes of think-
ing, he argues that standard modernization theory has little to say about post-industrial
societies. In such societies, post-material values gain importance. Post-material values
are best understood in juxtaposition to material values. Whereas material values entail
that individuals prefer the fulﬁllment of material needs (e.g. food, shelter, security, consu-
mer goods), post-material values entail that individuals prefer fulﬁllment of non-material
needs (e.g. freedom, self-expression, equality, environmental protection).
Inglehart’s theory builds on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943), which states that
human needs can be hierarchically ordered as ranging from physiological, through
safety, belonging, and esteem to self-actualization, where lower level needs must be
satisﬁed before higher level needs are considered. Two mechanisms then can account
for the acquisition of post-material values according to Inglehart.
The ﬁrst mechanism is known as the scarcity hypothesis, which states that the value
orientations of individuals directly reﬂect their socio-economic environment. Adverse
socio-economic conditions imply that individuals face diﬃculty in fulﬁlling lower level
needs, which are thus prioritized, leading to materialist value orientations. With better
socio-economic conditions, the fulﬁllment of lower level needs becomes easier and indi-
viduals care increasingly about the fulﬁllment of higher level needs, leading to post-
material value orientations.
The second mechanism is known as the socialization hypothesis, which states that the
value orientations are to a large extent shaped during individuals’ formative years, the
period between the onset of puberty and adulthood, and remain stable thereafter.
Cohorts that experience their formative years during adverse socio-economic times are
more likely to have material value orientations, whereas cohorts with formative years in
better times are more likely to have post-material value orientations. The reasoning for
the acquisition of (post-)material values is thus quite similar in both mechanisms, the
main diﬀerence is in the time frame within which societies will change in response: this
change would be instantaneous under the scarcity hypothesis, but more gradual and
delayed under the socialization hypothesis as it would then be driven entirely by
cohort-replacement. It is however in particular the socialization hypothesis that ﬁnds sub-
stantial empirical support (e.g. Inglehart, 1977, 1990).
The dependent variable in our study reﬂects preferences for sustainable investments.
More precisely, we analyze to what extent pension fund participants prefer sustainable
investments even if these investments entail receiving lower pensions or paying higher
pension premiums. Applying Inglehart’s post-materialism theory to our research
context, we derive two hypotheses about this variable. For both hypotheses, we argue
that post-materialism contributes to preferences for sustainable investing. This is
because (a) post-material values imply precisely the kind of preferences that are
satisﬁed with sustainable investments, i.e. environmental protection and self-expression;
and (b) because our measurement of preferences for sustainable investments explicitly
forces individuals to recognize that such investments may have adverse eﬀects on their
own monetary outcomes, thus being in conﬂict with material values. The ﬁrst hypothesis
is based on the knowledge that our research context the Netherlands represents a country
that has enjoyed a high level of socio-economic development for a long period, and a
country in which post-material values are indeed relatively prevalent (cf. World Values
Survey, n.d.). Therefore, we hypothesize that:
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Preferences for sustainable investments are substantial in the Netherlands.
Since we cannot test this hypothesis comparatively across countries, whether or not the
preferences are in fact substantial will be evaluated with a qualitative assessment of the
univariate distribution of our dependent variable. It should, however, be kept in mind
that any tendency towards sustainable investments preferences would be at odds with
standard neoclassical investment theory.
The second hypothesis we derive will test the implied micro-level link between post-
material value orientation and sustainable investment preferences:
Higher levels of post-material value orientations are associated with stronger preferences for
sustainable investments.
4. Dutch pension funds: a case in point
The Dutch occupational pension system is interesting and appropriate for the examination
of the willingness to pay for non-ﬁnancial preferences by pension fund participants. The
Netherlands is one of the most post-material societies in the world (World Values Survey,
n.d.). However, in the investment policy practice of Dutch pension funds, there is still little
attention to non-ﬁnancial preferences of pension fund members.
According to the inﬂuential Frijns Committee (2010) socially responsible acting is not
an integrated part of risk management and investment policies of pension funds. It rec-
ommends to the boards of pension funds to take the preferences of the participants and
the employers with regard to sustainability as a starting point for risk and investment
policy. The occupational pension is an important fringe beneﬁt (deferred wage). Compul-
sory participation explains why some 90% of the Dutch employees participate in a sup-
plementary occupational scheme (second pension pillar), on top of the basic state
pension (ﬁrst pension pillar). For 20% of employees the employer concludes a pension
insurance with an insurer; 80% of employees take part in industry, enterprise, or occu-
pational pension fund. Around half of the Dutch self-employed participate in a sup-
plementary pension scheme. Over 90% of the pension fund participants are covered by
a DB scheme.
Typically the ﬁnal pension beneﬁt depends on the number of years worked and salary
movements during the active period. The still dominant DB system implies that individual
respondents to our questionnaire do not have to take the risk into account, only the
payment of additional contribution or the lower beneﬁt amount. The Netherlands
belongs to the ﬁve largest pension fund markets within the OECD member countries.
In 2017 the amount of assets held by pension funds was worth USD 1.6 billion (almost
184% of GDP) (OECD, 2018). Similar mandatory collective pension funds that cover
the employees of more than one employer (enterprise) operate in various OECD countries
(see Blome et al., 2007; Ebbinghaus, 2011).
Pension funds are not-for-proﬁt institutions, with a long-term horizon and strategy,
which, in principle, is in line with sustainability. Pension funds’ assets are owned by the
participants. Pension funds invest on behalf of the participants. Unlike regular share-
holders, the owners of pension funds have no direct inﬂuence on the investment policies
of pension funds. Freedom of choice is restricted or even absent. Dutch pension funds
rank among the largest in the world (Vitols, 2011). Only a minority of the Dutch
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pension funds consult the participants about investments which are done with their
money (VBDO, 2014; Wagemans et al., 2018). Pension funds invest on behalf of the
owners of the assets, the participants. In the dominant investment theory participants
of pension funds only have ﬁnancial interests. There is still little regard for non-
ﬁnancial preferences of investors and pension fund members.
Recently pension fund members are increasingly seen as consumers. Pensions are
becoming less and less a condition of employment (fringe beneﬁt), but are increasingly
ﬁnancial products that consumers value and have a certain feeling (Kortleve and Slager,
2010). Like in many European pension systems, paternalism prevails. Social partners
and pension fund determine what participants need and what is good for them; to
prevent unwanted eﬀects of pension illiteracy among participants. By 2020 the Dutch gov-
ernment wants to realize more freedom of choice and more customization in the second
pension pillar (Klijnsma, 2015). Neither reference is made to SRI nor to sustainable invest-
ments in this policy document.
5. Data and method
5.1. Data
In order to test our hypotheses, we developed the ‘Stated Preference Analysis of Flexible
Pension Plan Choices in the Netherlands’ survey.1 This survey was ﬁelded in March 2014
in the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel, an Internet panel
of respondents maintained by CentERdata at Tilburg University.2 The questionnaire was
designed by our research team, in close collaboration with the CentERdata, taking advantage
of their extensive experience with survey research. To improve the validity of the survey,
multiple pre-tests were ﬁelded among the three members of the research team. We
further reﬂect on the development of the relevant individual items and their validity below.
The LISS panel consists of a nationally representative sample of 5,000 Dutch house-
holds comprising 8,000 individuals. Surveys may lead to socially desirable answers from
the respondents. This applies in particular to face-to-face interviews. As our survey was
conducted online, the greater degree of anonymity provides less socially desirable
answers (Teppa and Vis, 2012), which is especially desirable given that our dependent
variable concerns people’s stated preferences for sustainable investments.
We consulted existing studies on the preferences of Dutch pension fund members and
their willingness to pay for sustainable investments (Erbé, 2008; Rietjens, 2011; Motivac-
tion, 2012; Borgers and Pownall, 2014; I&O Research, 2015; |Apostolakis et al., 2016, 2018)
to develop measurement of participants’ willingness to pay. Due to our research aim of
analyzing pension investments preferences, we restricted our sample to respondents
aged 40 and older (5,034 respondents of the LISS panel) and that are pension fund par-
ticipants. Younger people are a diﬃcult target group for pension funds. In contrast to
the maximization objective in the neoclassical economic theory they have little interest
in pensions and are more often completely unconscious about pensions (see Mitchell
and Utkus, 2004; Rietjens, 2011; Prast and Van Soest, 2014). This implies that the
results of surveys on pensions among young people are unreliable. By restricting our
sample to older pension fund participants, we are able to more accurately measure true
and salient preferences.
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The response rate of the survey amounted to 80.8%. Not all variables needed for our
analyses were recorded in the survey. However, none of these variables are likely to show sig-
niﬁcant short-term variation and they were measured in other surveys ﬁelded in the LISS
panel very close in time to our original survey among the same respondents. This allowed
us to supplement our dataset with data on the relevant variables from these other surveys.3
After the deletion of cases with missing values, we retain 2486 respondents for analysis.
This makes for a net-response of just under 49.38%, in line with most other survey research
conducted in the Netherlands. A comparison of the dependent variable and a standard set of
background characteristics in the initial dataset to the dataset excluding the caseswithmissing
values4 supports that the eventual sample we use to test our hypotheses is representative.
5.2. Measures
At the time of designing our survey, existing analyses of preferences for sustainable
pension fund investments were extremely scarce and no validated measurements were
available. Hence, in order to measure our dependent variable, the respondent’s preference
for sustainable pension fund investments (hereafter preference for sustainability), we
developed our own measurement. We aimed for a measure that reﬂected the three
main categories of factors considered in SRI (OECD, 2007, p. 4): social, environmental
and ethical (SEE). SRI research is increasingly focused on non-ethical aspects; corporate
governance is incorporated instead (OECD, 2007, p. 4–5). In addition to ﬁnancial per-
formance also environmental, social and governance (ESG)-performances are taken into
consideration. SRI is considered a means to improve the risk-return proﬁle. This materi-
ality approach to SRI ﬁts the neoclassical investment theory (Vitols, 2011; Delsen, 2012).
In the normative approach to SRI social values and norms are a higher good than proﬁt-
making. People are willing to pay for SRI; tradeoﬀs, i.e. lower ﬁnancial returns are
accepted. It ﬁts the behavioral ﬁnance theory. For answering our research question the
more narrow SEE measure of SRI is more appropriate than the ESG measure.
As it would be practically impossible to measure observed preferences, we developed an
eﬃcient and easily comprehensible measurement of respondents’ willingness to pay. To
ensure respondents properly understand SRI, we included an introductory text explaining
its meaning, using concrete examples of social and ethical factors: ‘working conditions’
(social), ‘child labor and production of banned weapons’ (ethical). For environmental
factors, we deemed reference to the environment as suﬃciently concrete for the respondents.
Importantly, we aimed to reduce social desirability bias by forcing respondent’s to explicitly
recognize and choose a tradeoﬀ between SRI and their personal ﬁnancial reward. To again
make this suﬃciently concrete for the respondents, we explicitly referred to the two ways in
which SRI may make them worse oﬀ ﬁnancially: higher premiums (current consumption),
or lower beneﬁts (future consumption). The eventual survey question thus read as follows:
In responsible investment account shall be taken of, inter alia, the environment, working con-
ditions, child labor and production of banned weapons. Do you agree with the following
statement:
My pension fund should do responsible investment, even if this will require me to pay a
higher pension premium or receive a lower pension.
(If you do not have a pension fund please select not applicable)
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The valid answering categories ranged from 1 ‘completely disagree’ to 6 ‘strongly agree’,
with 7 ‘not applicable’ coded as missing value. We treat this as a continuous variable
on which higher values indicate a higher preference for sustainability. It is not currently
possible to assess the predictive validity of this variable with respect to actual investment
decisions. However, other research employing a variety of willingness to pay and hypothe-
tical choice measurements, published on pension fund participants in the Netherlands
after we ﬁelded our survey (Bauer, Ruof and Smeets, 2018), ﬁnds highly comparable dis-
tributions of sustainability preferences. This does suggest that concurrent validity may be
quite high.
For our main independent variable, value orientation, we employ a well-accepted
survey measurement ﬁrst developed by Inglehart (1971). For this measurement, the
respondents are asked to rank four potential political goals in order of importance: (a)
‘maintaining law and order in the country’, (b) ‘increasing citizens’ political say’, (c) ‘pre-
venting price increases’, and (d) ‘protecting freedom of speech’. The ﬁrst and third goals (a
and c) tap material values, whereas the second and third (b and d) tap post-material
values. By asking respondents to rank these goals, they are thus forced to priorities
between goals that reﬂect either material or post-material value orientations. The
responses are subsequently combined into one ordinal variable measuring value orien-
tation. This is achieved by considering the ﬁrst and second-ranked goals for each respon-
dent. If these two goals both reﬂect material values (i.e. a and c or c and a are ranked ﬁrst
and second), the respondent is coded as ‘materialist’. If these goals both reﬂect post-
material values, (i.e. b and d or d and b are ranked ﬁrst and second), the respondent is
coded as ‘post-materialist’. Respondents whose ﬁrst and second-ranked goals reﬂect a
combination of material and post-material values are coded as ‘mixed’. This measure is
admittedly a very coarse reﬂection of the underlying continuum of value orientations
from materialist to post-materialist. However, it does allow us to consistently diﬀerentiate
between respondents with diﬀerent value orientations and a large body of previous
research has demonstrated its validity and reliability (e.g. Inglehart and Abramson,
1999). For inclusion in the multivariate analyses, the measure is recoded into two
dummy variables, using ‘materialist’ as the reference category.
In order to measure risk appetite, we use a translation of the self-assessment measure
from the German SOEP survey, which has been found to yield a valid indicator (e.g.
Dohmen et al., 2005; Ding et al., 2010). The respondents were asked to self-rate their will-
ingness to take risk on ﬁnancial matters on a scale ranging from 0 ‘highly risk averse’ to 10
‘fully prepared to take risks’. We treat this as a continuous variable with higher values indi-
cating more ﬁnancial risk appetite.
In order to account for the impact of religiosity, we measured whether or not respon-
dents considered themselves to be member of a certain religion or church community. In
the multivariate analyses, we used dummy coding for this variables, with the religious
serving as the reference category.
The respondents were also asked about the company size of the place where they work
or worked, if applicable. We recoded this measurement into four categories, ‘1–24’, ‘25–
499’, ‘≥500’ employees, and ‘not applicable’. Dummy coding was used for this variable
in the multivariate analyses, with ‘1–24’ serving as the reference category.
The LISS panel records and monthly updates a large set of personal characteristics5,
from which we include, following the standard literature on SRI (see also Table 1)
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gender, age, household composition, type of dwelling, education, primary occupation and net
household income. The ‘gender’ variable records whether respondents are male or female.
Age is measured in years. The ‘household composition’ variable distinguishes between
‘single’, ‘cohabitation6 without children’, ‘cohabitation with children’, ‘single with chil-
dren’ and ‘other’ types of households. With ‘type of dwelling’, we include a measure of
capital accumulation as it records whether the respondents live in rental dwelling or in
self-owned dwelling. We recoded education (highest obtained diploma) into three cat-
egories; ‘low’7, ‘middle’8, and ‘high’.9 For primary occupation, we distinguish between
‘paid employment’, ‘self-employed’10, ‘job seeker’, ‘pensioner’, ‘housekeeper’, and ‘not
employed other’.11 Net household income is measured in Euros.12 All categorical variables
were dummy-coded for inclusion in the multivariate analysis, with respectively ‘male’,
‘single’, ‘self-owned’, ‘low’ and ‘paid employment’ used as reference categories.
5.3. Methods
As a ﬁrst step in our analysis, we will provide descriptive statistics on all variables, focusing
in particular on the central tendency and distribution of the dependent variable preference
for sustainability.
We then proceed to test our hypotheses by estimating two linear (OLS) regression
models. As the eﬀect of the respondents’ background characteristics and socio-economic
variables on preference for sustainability may be (partially) mediated through value orien-
tations and risk appetite, we ﬁrst estimate a model including all independent variables
except for these two variables. In the second model, value orientations and risk appetite
are added to the equation.
A potential problem for this approach is that our dependent variable may be inter-
preted more strictly as being at best ordinal in nature, especially as the answering cat-
egories presented to the respondents are not symmetric around the ‘neutral’ category
due to a technical error resulting in the omission of one of the categories. In this case
the assumptions of monotonic, linear relationships and constant, normally distributed
errors of the (OLS) linear regression models may be problematic. We therefore assessed
the robustness of our results by estimating the generalized ordered logit equivalents of
the linear regression models presented here (see also Peterson and Harrell, 1990; Williams,
2016). Fortunately, the (averaged) marginal eﬀects derived from these models are in line
with the ﬁndings from the linear regression models, allowing us to here present the latter.
This facilitates easier interpretation of the eﬀects, has the added beneﬁt that the estimated
coeﬃcients can be compared across the two estimated equations, and is less prone to
overﬁtting the data. As the assumption of normally distributed, constant errors is likely
at least somewhat problematic, we calculate heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors for signiﬁcance tests.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive analyses
In Table 2, descriptive statistics on all variables are reported. Noteworthy is the relatively
high mean value (4.39 on a scale from 1 to 6) of the dependent variable preference for
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sustainability. The variable does in fact show substantial left skew (skewness =−0.72,
median = 5), and roughly three-quarters of the respondents score a value of 4 or higher.
This strongly suggests that, contrary to standard economic theory and pension fund
investment policies, but in line with our ﬁrst hypothesis and prior research, pension
funds participants considerably favor sustainable investing even if this implies paying
higher premiums or receiving lower pensions. Looking at the extremes of the scale,
about 22% strongly agrees with sustainable investments, while only about 4% completely
disagree with it. At the same time, strong preferences for sustainability are by no means
universal as there is also some variation in the responses (s. d. = 1.34). A further analysis
in order to explain this variation is therefore apposite.
The distribution of background characteristics is very much in line with what one
would expect given our sample selection criteria. Three quarters of the respondents live
in some form of cohabitation household (married or unmarried, with or without chil-
dren), a similar number lives in a self-owned dwelling. Most respondents are still in
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (N = 2486).
Min. Max. Mean/percent Standard deviation
Preference for sustainability 1 6 4.39 1.34
Gender
Male 0 1 53.86
Female 0 1 46.14
Age 40 94 60.24 11.26
Household composition
Single 0 20.90
Cohabitation without children 0 1 48.95
Cohabitation with children 0 1 26.14
Single with children 0 1 3.46
Other 1 0.84
Type of dwelling
Self-owned 0 1 75.99
Rental 0 1 24.01
Education
Low 0 1 34.39
Middle 0 1 31.50
High 0 1 34.11
Primary occupation
Paid employment 0 1 42.80
Self-employed 0 1 4.34
Job seeker 0 1 3.58
Pensioner 0 1 35.48
Housekeeper 0 1 6.15
Not employed other 0 1 3.94
Company size
1–24 0 1 19.79
25–499 0 1 38.17
≥500 0 1 34.07
not applicable 0 1 7.96
Net household income (natural logarithm) 5.70 12.49 7.88 0.48
Religious
yes 0 1 39.86
no 0 1 60.14
Risk appetite 0 10 3.95 2.30
Value orientation
Materialist 0 1 20.84
Mixed 0 1 65.81
Post-materialist 0 1 13.35
Source: LISS Panel.
252 L. DELSEN AND A. LEHR
paid employment, but about 35% are already pensioners. Value orientations distinguish
between the materialists, about 21% of the sample; post-materialists, about 13% of the
sample; with the remainder of the sample (about 66%) consisting of those with mixed
value orientations. The modest share of post-materialists is in line with Inglehart’s
cohort-replacement theory: since our sample consists of people of 40 years or older,
post-materialism is still relatively less prevalent in these cohorts.
6.2. Hypotheses tests
The results of the (OLS) regression analyses in Table 3 support for some of the hypotheses
derived from SRI literature in Table 1, but no evidence in favor of most. Heterogeneity is
less than expected from the pension literature (e.g. Bovenberg et al., 2012). Not controlling
for the eﬀects of risk appetite and value orientation, we ﬁnd – in line with most earlier
research – that women have stronger preferences for sustainability, and that such prefer-
ences increase with educational attainment. Our analysis also suggests that self-employed
persons and housekeepers have a signiﬁcantly higher willingness to pay for sustainability
than those in paid employment. However, we do not ﬁnd the eﬀects of household compo-
sition and religiosity on the preference for sustainability, nor for home-ownership or
income. Sustainability is not a luxury good. Unlike most research, age is found to have
a positive eﬀect, but it should be remembered that our sample includes only those aged
40 years and older, thus severely limiting the range of this variable, and that it is not poss-
ible to distinguish between the contribution of age, period and cohort eﬀects to the associ-
ation. There is no theoretical rational in the investment literature for the positive eﬀects of
education; for the gender, age and self-employed the rational is weak, requiring diﬀerences
in risk and return perception of SRI (Junkus and Berry, 2010). A possible explanation is
that environmental awareness and environmental concern are higher among women, and
positively correlated with education level (see, e.g. Franzen and Meyer, 2010). The positive
relation for self-employment may be related to the fact that it not only attracts optimistic
people, it also is a consequence of ﬁnancial optimism (Dawson et al., 2014).
Including risk appetite and value orientation in the model does not substantively
change the ﬁndings for these background characteristics. We ﬁnd no evidence suggesting
that risk appetite has any inﬂuence on the preference for sustainability. Thus, while risk
appetite may be very important in explaining diﬀerences in the preferences for the risk-
return tradeoﬀ inherent in the traditional investment literature, it appears to contribute
little to our understanding of diﬀerences in the preference for sustainable investing.
What does contribute to our understanding of such diﬀerences however are value
orientations. The eﬀect of being more post-materialist is in fact in line with our hypothesis.
Post-materialists have stronger preferences for sustainability than materialists, those with
mixed value orientations are in between. The diﬀerence in predicted values between mate-
rialists and post-materialists on our six-point scale for the preference for sustainability
amounts to almost 0.4 points.
Measures of model ﬁt for both estimated models indicate that although we are able to
explain a signiﬁcant amount of variation, there is a sizeable amount of it we are not able to
account for. R-squared measures should of course never be interpreted as a one-to-one
reﬂection of the strength of explanatory power of the causal eﬀects in the population.
However, there is in this case at least reason to believe that much may still be gained
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Table 3. (OLS) linear regression of preferences for sustainable pension fund
investments on risk appetite and value heterogeneity and background characteristics.
Model 1 Model 2
b b
Intercept 3.008*** 2.857***
(0.546) (0.547)
Gender (dummy)
Male Reference Reference
Female 0.165** 0.163**
(0.056) (0.056)
Age 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004)
Household composition (dummies)
Single Reference Reference
Cohabitation without children 0.096 0.112
(0.077) (0.077)
Cohabitation with children −0.105 −0.072
(0.103) (0.102)
Single with children −0.076 −0.052
(0.154) (0.152)
Other −0.413 −0.394
(0.329) (0.329)
Type of dwelling
Self-owned Reference Reference
Rental −0.002 −0.014
(0.070) (0.069)
Education (dummies)
Low Reference Reference
Middle 0.162* 0.147*
(0.070) (0.070)
High 0.474*** 0.436***
(0.069) (0.069)
Primary occupation
Paid employment Reference Reference
Self-employed 0.252† 0.233†
(0.137) (0.139)
Job seeker −0.012 −0.049
(0.158) (0.157)
Pensioner −0.072 −0.079
(0.093) (0.093)
Housekeeper 0.262* 0.260*
(0.113) (0.113)
Not employed other 0.120 0.109
(0.115) (0.115)
Company size
1–24 Reference Reference
25–499 −0.054 −0.060
(0.073) (0.072)
≥500 −0.014 −0.023
(0.076) (0.075)
not applicable −0.194† −0.162
(0.113) (0.113)
Net household income (natural logarithm) 0.023 0.012
(0.069) (0.068)
Religious (dummy)
yes Reference Reference
no −0.028 −0.012
(0.055) (0.055)
Risk appetite 0.003
(0.013)
Value orientation
Materialist Reference
(Continued )
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by future development of novel explanations for diﬀerences between people in their pre-
ferences for sustainability.
In sum, the ﬁndings support our hypothesis that value orientations are valuable in
understanding sustainability preferences and show some but rather meager support for
standard explanations from the investment literature, and they point towards the need
for further theoretical development.
6.3. Robustness analysis
The results of our analysis were subject to an extensive robustness analysis. For one, the
independent variables age and income were inspected for the presence of non-linear
eﬀects (by analyzing the residuals and testing quadratic terms), for which we found no
evidence.
Second, we re-estimated our models as generalized ordered logit models. Ordered logit
models can be viewed as extensions of the standard binomial logit model that can be esti-
mated on data where the dependent variable is ordinal, or equivalently as simpliﬁcations
of the multinomial logit model where the diﬀerent coeﬃcients estimated for each indepen-
dent variable is restricted to be of the same value. The coeﬃcients represent the eﬀect of
the independent variables on the natural logarithm of the odds of falling within the lowest
to each particular value of the dependent variable compared to the other categories (1 vs.
2–6; 1 and 2 vs. 3–6; 1–3 vs. 4–6, etc.). In the generalized ordered logit model, the eﬀects
are estimated (via maximum likelihood) in a single coeﬃcient value if, roughly speaking,
the model-implied underlying changes in probability can be adequately represented by a
set parallel running S-curves (the proportional odds assumption of the model is then
satisﬁed). If this is not the case, the eﬀect is represented by ﬁve separate coeﬃcient
values, one for each of the contrasts. The advantage of this model is that it adequately
deals with the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, that it does not suﬀer from the
potential violations to assumptions that our OLS regressions may suﬀer from, and that
it does so relatively eﬃciently by only lifting the restriction of equal coeﬃcients across
response categories when this is necessary.
After estimating the generalized ordered logit models, we calculated the averaged mar-
ginal eﬀects. The results of this analysis showed that the estimates from the linear (OLS)
Table 3. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2
b b
Mixed 0.277***
(0.069)
Post-materialist 0.394***
(0.093)
F 6.64*** 6.87***
RMSE 1.313 1.308
F 6.34*** 6.58***
R2 0.046 0.055
Notes: b, unstandardized coeﬃcient.
Robust (HC) standard errors in parentheses.
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; (two-tailed).
Source: LISS Panel.
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regression models are not seriously biased by the nature of the dependent variable.
However, not all results were substantively identical. In particular, we found that the pro-
portional odds assumption did not hold for the risk appetite variable.
However, while relaxing this assumption resulted in ﬁnding signiﬁcant eﬀects for at
least some contrasts, these estimated eﬀects were not in line with any theoretical expec-
tation. Our conclusion is that these eﬀects are more likely to be due to overﬁtting
rather than representing any actual population eﬀects. They are in any case not consistent
with any theoretically justiﬁed hypothesis about the eﬀect of risk appetite, thus validating
our upholding of the null-hypothesis in this case, as in our main results.
7. Conclusions and policy recommendations
The results of our study are important to pension funds, institutional investors and
investment professionals generally, and to governments. Firstly, we ﬁnd that sustain-
able pension fund investment is considerably favored. Roughly three-quarters at least
to some extent favor sustainable investing, even if this implies paying higher pre-
miums (less current consumption) or receiving a lower pension (less future consump-
tion). This strongly suggests that current pension fund policies, guided by the
neoclassical economics focus on narrow ﬁnancial self-interest, is unlikely to adequately
represent the actual preferences of their participants. Secondly, our ﬁnding of a clear
micro-level link between preferences for sustainable pension fund investments and
participants’ post-material value orientations provides valuable insight into how het-
erogeneity among participants arises. Moreover, this ﬁnding suggests that, at least
in most of the Western world, the demand for sustainable pension fund investments
is likely to further increase, as more post-material cohorts replace less post-material
ones.
Regarding the explanatory power of standard investment theories, our results paint a
mixed and somewhat underwhelming picture, showing no impact of income, house own-
ership, or risk appetite. We do ﬁnd that women are more likely to prefer sustainability
than men are, that these preference increase with age and with educational attainment,
and that self-employed and housekeepers prefer sustainability more than those in paid
employment, job seekers and pensioners.
Two main limitations apply to our study. First, the question remains to what extent
stated willingness to pay is related to actual investment decisions with real ﬁnancial con-
sequences. Second, given that we analyzed observational data, the associations we esti-
mated may not accurately reﬂect causal eﬀects due to endogeneity, although we were
able to control for a large set of variables.
In line with previous analyses on SRI (e.g. Williams, 2007; Pérez-Gladish et al., 2012)
and analyses on preferences of pension fund participants (Borgers and Pownall, 2014;
Apostolakis et al., 2016), we ﬁnd that the explanatory power of the eﬀects in our analysis
is limited. This suggests that the literature on SRI in general and sustainable pension fund
investments in particular are still in dire need of further development. We suggest three
potential fruitful avenues.
First, little is known about the impact of beneﬁciaries’ knowledge and evaluations of
issues SRI aims to address in the ﬁrst place. For instance, diﬀerences in their knowledge
about climate change and its potential impact are likely to inﬂuence the utility they
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derive from SRI and hence their willingness to pay for sustainable. Future survey research
would hence be well served by including items on such issues.
Second and related, country-speciﬁc contexts related to the issues addressed by SRI, e.g.
environmental pollution, working conditions, may also impact aﬀect sustainability prefer-
ences. Better country-comparative microdata will be needed to investigate such
explanations.
Third, age appears to impact positively on sustainability preferences in many studies,
including ours, but the mechanisms for this eﬀect are not well understood. In particular,
it would be interesting for future research to disentangle lifecycle, period and cohort
elements of this eﬀect. This would be particularly facilitated by collecting longitudinal
data on beneﬁciaries.
Considering the practical implications of our research, we end by noting that it is not so
much whether non-ﬁnancial factors can or should be taken into account, but how to do it,
to what extent and under what conditions. According to Scholtens and Sprengers (2000)
the Pension Act prompts pension funds to invest for high returns in the short term. Inte-
gration of sustainability indicators in the Pension Act could incite pension funds also to
pursue a good and sustainable yield in the long term. Given the heterogeneity in prefer-
ences of participants it is diﬃcult for fund managers to incorporate them in their invest-
ment decision. Uniform investment policy may favor or harm certain groups of
participants. This can prevent pension funds from introducing a sustainable investment
policy. However, there may be agreement on a number of basic values. Widely accepted
social and environmental standards can serve as a proxy for the values of the participants.
For example, international agreements on cluster bombs, environmental protection,
human rights, working conditions and against corruption (Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus Derin-
ger, 2005). Inﬂuence (‘voice’) and direct involvement of participants in the decision-
making process of their pension fund can lead to consensus on many issues. Shareholder,
i.e. pension fund activism can also contribute to more sustainable investments. Another
alternative is the development of sustainable investment choices for the participants or
full investment autonomy (Richardson, 2007, p. 166; Jansson et al., 2014). However,
this is only possible if the participants are ﬁnancially responsible and capable of healthy
ﬁnancial decisions (Borgers and Pownall, 2014). People are on average unable to make
consistent choices with respect to the risk-return tradeoﬀ (Van Rooij et al., 2007). More-
over, heterogeneity is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for the introduction of
options. For adding sustainability characteristics to the choice frame work of risk and
return increases the complexity of the ﬁnancial products (Delsen, 2015). This extra dimen-
sion makes ﬁnancial decisions more diﬃcult and thus the ability of the average pension
participant to incorporate both the ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial preferences in his decision.
In addition, account should be taken of less economies of scale, degradation of the
solidarity, distributional issues, and higher administrative burden and transaction costs
for all parties.
Notes
1. The survey was ﬁelded in the Dutch language; all reports on the survey presented here are
English translations. The questionnaire also included vignette items for a related research
project. For more details on our survey questions see https://www.dataarchive.lissdata.nl/
study_units/view/500.
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2. “The LISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly
Internet surveys. The panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from
the population register. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a
computer and Internet connection. A longitudinal survey is ﬁelded in the panel every year,
covering a large variety of domains including work, education, income, housing, time use,
political views, values and personality.” See also https://www.surveydata.nl/liss-panel-data-
archive.
3. Respondents’ (post)material value orientations were taken from wave 7 of the ‘Politics and
Values’ LISS Core Study ﬁelded in December 2013 and January 2014, their religious orien-
tations were taken from wave 7 of the ‘Religion and Ethnicity’ LISS Core Study ﬁelded in
January and February 2014.
4. For instance by using z-tests to compare the proportions observed in each of the categories of
the dependent variables, none of which were statistically signiﬁcant. Similar tests on the dis-
tribution of age (in 10-year interval categories) and gender showed a slight underrepresenta-
tion of women compared to men in our eventual sample that however does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect our ﬁndings.
5. See https://www.lissdata.nl/about-panel/composition-and-response.
6. Married or unmarried.
7. Primary school or intermediate secondary education diploma (US: junior high school).
8. Higher secondary education/preparatory university education (US: senior high school) or
intermediate vocational education (US: junior college).
9. Higher vocational education (US: college) or university.
10. Including family business, autonomous professional and freelancer.
11. Including exempt from job seeking, studying, work.
12. We use a version of this variable with missing values (about 7% in our sample) imputed by
the LISS panel.
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